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Abstract: According to classical theism, impassibility is said to be systematically 
connected to divine attributes like timelessness, immutability, simplicity, aseity, 
and self-sufficiency. In some interesting way, these attributes are meant to 
explain why the impassible God cannot suffer. I shall argue that these attributes 
do not explain why the impassible God cannot suffer. In order to understand 
why the impassible God cannot suffer, one must examine the emotional life of the 
impassible God. I shall argue that the necessarily happy emotional life of the 
classical God explains why the impassible God cannot suffer.  
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Throughout most of the history of Christianity, the doctrine of divine impassibility has 
enjoyed wide assent. However, its role in systematic theology has waxed and waned in 
different eras. During the early Christological debates, impassibility was the default 
view. It played an influential role against Logos-sarx models of the incarnation as well 
as a role in late Arian arguments against the full divinity of Christ.1 Later generations, 
however, have not cast a favorable eye on impassibility. Before the turn of the 20th 
Century, various theologians began to endorse divine passibility in reaction to the 
unethical implications they perceived to be involved in the doctrine of divine 
impassibility. In 1900, Marshall Randles commented that this modern acceptance of 
divine passibility is merely a passing mood that “will probably turn out to be one of 
those temporary reactions which come and go.”2 For better or worse, Randles’ 
prediction did not come to pass. Far from a temporary reaction, the doctrine of divine 
passibility received such a widespread acceptance in the 20th Century that it came to be 
referred to as the new orthodoxy. Many theologians came to see divine impassibility as 
deeply unbiblical because the bible has no problem affirming that God suffers.3 Yet 
despite the complete lack of biblical evidence for divine impassibility, the doctrine does 
                                                          
1 (Mozley 1926, 92-93; Eunomius 1987).  
2 (Randles 1900, 5). 
3 (Bauckham 2008; Moltmann 2001; Torrance 1989; Fretheim 1984). 
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enjoy several prominent defenders today.4 In fact, I would hazard a prediction that 
divine impassibility is going to make a comeback in Christian theology.5  
For many theologians, the debate between divine impassibility and divine passibility 
will seem deeply puzzling. The arguments for either view can sometimes be difficult to 
untangle, and the rhetoric from both sides can seem uncharitable at times. To make 
matters even more complicated, some contemporary theologians try to claim that God is 
both impassible and passible. How is the Christian theologian supposed to make sense 
of all of this? I strongly suspect that there is a lack of understanding in the contemporary 
world of theology as to what the doctrine of impassibility actually affirms. At times it 
seems as if contemporary Christian thinkers are simply talking past one another because 
they are focusing on different kinds of issues. 
In contemporary discussions of the doctrine of divine impassibility, different groups 
focus on different questions. As Anastasia Scrutton has pointed out, contemporary 
theologians have primarily focused on the question, “Can God Suffer?” whereas 
contemporary philosophers of religion have focused on the question, “Does God have 
emotions?”6 I believe that these questions are fundamentally related, but the way the 
debates have unfolded has sometimes missed these connections. As a way of exploring 
the dogmatic prospects for analytic theology, I wish to develop the connections between 
these questions in order to bring about greater clarity in our contemporary 
understanding of divine impassibility.   
In this paper I have one primary question: why can’t the impassible God suffer? 
Typically, it is thought that the answer to this question is due to impassibility’s 
systematic connections to other classical attributes like timelessness, immutability, 
simplicity, aseity, and self-sufficiency. I shall argue that the systematic connections to 
these attributes do not obviously entail that God cannot suffer. Instead, I will argue that 
one must look for an answer in the impassible God’s emotional life. In other words, the 
answer to my primary question lies in answering a secondary question: does the 
impassible God have emotions? The classical doctrine of God does in fact attribute 
emotions to the divine life, and understanding the classical divine emotions will help 
one understand why the impassible God cannot suffer.  
                                                          
4 E.g. (Weinandy 2000). It is worth noting that several recent defenses of impassibility offer no 
engagement with the work of biblical scholars and systematic theologians like Bauckham, Bruggemann, 
Fretheim, Moltmann, or Torrance. E.g. (Baines, et al. 2015). Other proponents of impassibility attempt to 
engage with these scholars, but their reading of the biblical material seems to assume that classical theism 
is easily read off of the surface of the biblical text. E.g. (Duby 2016, chapters 3-4). This reading classical 
theism ‘off of the surface’ of the biblical material is something that biblical scholars like D.A. Carson find 
implausible (Carson 2006, 165). 
5 Of course, in 100 years some theologian may well look at my prediction and say that it is just as 
deeply mistaken as Randles’ prediction. Perhaps, in the eschaton, Randles and I can bond over our 
inability to predict the next theological fashion trend. 
6 (Scrutton 2013, 866). 
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Section I shall briefly define the classical understanding of God as timeless, 
immutable, and simple. Section II shall begin to explore the doctrine of divine 
impassibility, and argue that it is not obvious why the impassible God cannot suffer. 
Section III will explore the impassible God’s emotional life, and explain why the 
impassible God cannot suffer.  
 
1. Classical Theism 
 
The classical understanding of God is a package deal that comes with attributes like 
timelessness, immutability, simplicity, and impassibility. To be sure, classical theism 
also affirms attributes like aseity, self-sufficiency, omnipotence, omniscience, and so on, 
but such attributes are also affirmed by modified or neo-classical theists, open theists, 
and some relational theists.7 What makes classical theism unique is its commitment to 
divine timelessness, immutability, simplicity, and impassibility since these attributes are 
held to be systematically connected. Elsewhere I have given a thorough examination of 
the attributes of timelessness, immutability, and simplicity.8 So in this section, I shall 
only offer brief definitions of these attributes.  
To begin our discussion, allow me to make a few quick remarks about the nature of 
time. Classical theists have historically affirmed a relational theory of time, and a 
presentist ontology of time.9 On a relational theory of time, time exists if and only if a 
change occurs.10 This is because a change creates a before and an after, and part of the 
nature of time involves events being in before and after relations. On presentism, only 
the present moment of time exists. Past moments of time no longer exist, and future 
moments of time do not yet exist. The present exhausts all of reality. So whatever exists, 
exists at the present.  
Classical Christian theism used these assumptions about the nature of time to 
articulate the doctrine of divine timelessness. On classical theism, one of the key 
characteristics of a temporal object is that it undergoes change and succession. One of 
the key characteristics of a timeless being is that it does not undergo change or 
succession.11 To say that God is timeless is to say that God’s life lacks a beginning, an 
end, and succession. A timeless God dwells in an eternal present that lacks a before and 
after.12  
                                                          
7 (Mullins 2016a). 
8 (Mullins 2016b, chapter 3). 
9 (Fox 2006, 134ff; Pasnau 2011; Anselm, Proslogion 13; Augustine 2001, XI). For a discussion of 
Augustine’s puzzles over the present see (Sorabji 2006, 29-32). J.R. Lucas offers a critique of some of 
Augustine’s puzzles about the present (Lucas 1973, chapter 4). 
10 For a classic debate over the relational theory of time, see (Alexander 1956). 
11 (Fox 2006, 226-227) 
12 (Pictet 1834, Book II.viii; Stock 1641, 91; Turretin 1992, 202; Strong 1907, 275). 
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Why does the timeless God dwell in an eternal present that lacks a before and after? 
This is because a timeless God is also an immutable God. An immutable God cannot 
change in any way, shape, or form.13 Since part of the nature of time involves 
undergoing change, an immutable God is said to be void of all temporality because He 
is void of all change. On the classical understanding of immutability, God cannot 
undergo any intrinsic nor any extrinsic changes.14 
Sometimes the classical doctrine of divine immutability is misunderstood in 
contemporary thought. Some modern theologians have reinvented the classical God by 
saying that the traditional, classical understanding is of a God who does undergo 
relational and Cambridge changes.15 This is not the classical understanding of 
immutability. As Peter Lombard makes clear, God cannot undergo any intrinsic nor any 
extrinsic change.16 This rules out Cambridge changes.  
A Cambridge change is a change that an object undergoes in relation to something 
else. The object does not undergo an intrinsic change, but merely undergoes an extrinsic 
change. For example, as I am currently typing this paper, I am north of the Cambridge 
Divinity Faculty. The Divinity Faculty building has the relational property “being south 
of Ryan.” Say that tomorrow I take a train down to Cambridge, and stand to the south 
of the Divinity Faculty. The Divinity Faculty building has changed relationally with 
regards to me, but nothing intrinsic to the building has changed. The building has 
merely gone from “being south of Ryan” to “being north of Ryan.” When contemporary 
theologians say that the classical God can undergo these sorts of changes, they are 
misrepresenting the tradition. Boethius actually gives a similar account of relational, or 
Cambridge changes, in The Trinity V. So classical Christian thinkers are aware of the 
concept of a Cambridge change, though they do not refer to them under this moniker. 
Boethius, like most classical theists, makes it clear that God does not undergo relational 
changes. Why? Because, according to Boethius, the category of relation does not apply 
to God at all.17 An immutable God, as classically conceived, cannot undergo relational, 
or Cambridge changes. In fact, from Augustine to Aquinas and beyond, classical theism 
denies that God is really related to creation in order to avoid saying that God undergoes 
relational, accidental changes.18 The claim that God is not really related to creation is a 
complicated matter. Since I have discussed it at length elsewhere, I shall say no more 
about it here.19 What matters for the purposes of this essay is that on classical theism, 
                                                          
13 (Vos 1999, 53). 
14 (Lombard 2007, Distinction XXXVII.7). 
15 E.g. (Gutenson 2002). 
16 (Lombard 2007, Distinction XXXVII.7). 
17 (Boethius, The Trinity, IV). 
18 (Augustine, The Trinity V.17; Boethius, The Trinity Is One God Not Three Gods IV; Lombard 2007, 
Distinction XXX.1; Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles II.12; Arminius 1986, Disputation IV.XIV). 
19 (Mullins 2016b, chapter 3 and 5). 
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God is immutable in that God cannot undergo any kind of change, be it intrinsic or 
extrinsic.  
With these admittedly brief statements on divine timelessness and immutability, we 
can move on to the doctrine of divine simplicity. On the classical Christian 
understanding of God, all of God’s essential attributes are identical to each other, and 
identical to the divine nature. For example, God’s attribute of omniscience is identical to 
God’s omnipotence, and these in turn are identical to the divine nature. With creatures 
like you and I, we are substances that possess properties like knowledge and power. 
With the simple God, this is not the case. The simple God does not possess any 
properties. Instead, there is the simple, undivided substance that we call God. This 
simple substance does not have any intrinsic or extrinsic properties because it does not 
possess any properties at all.20 As Peter Lombard makes clear, “The same substance 
alone is properly and truly simple in which there is no diversity or change or 
multiplicity of parts, or accidents, or of any other forms.”21 
Further, a simple God is purely actual. This means that the simple God does not 
possess any potential whatsoever.22 On classical theism, it is assumed that to possess 
potentiality implies mutability since going from potential to actual entails undergoing a 
change. Classical theism has already ruled out any kind of change in God, so a simple 
God must be purely actual. The claim that God is pure actuality and simple has further 
entailments. It entails that all of God’s actions are identical to each other such that there 
is only one divine act. Further, this one divine act is identical to the divine substance.23 
So the divine act of creation is identical to the divine act of salvation. And these identical 
acts are identical to the being of God. Which entails that God just is the act of creation! 
But let us not worry about that at the moment.24  
There are two further attributes that are worth discussing for the purposes of this 
paper: aseity and self-sufficiency. One might wonder why I have withheld a discussion 
of these attributes until now. Classical theists often claim that God’s aseity and self-
sufficiency entail that God is timeless, immutable, simple, and impassible. I cannot find 
any such systematic entailment from aseity and self-sufficiency to divine timelessness, 
immutability, and simplicity.25 Yet, classical theists insist that these attributes play such 
a role. For the purposes of this paper, I shall articulate these doctrines, then in section II, 
I shall explain why these attributes do not entail impassibility.  
Some readers will be unfamiliar with God’s self-sufficiency since it is not widely 
discussed in contemporary analytic theology. Further, it is often conflated with divine 
                                                          
20 (Augustine, The Trinity VII.10; Rogers 1996, 166; Church 1638, 23; Dolezal 2017, 71 and 123). 
21 (Lombard 2007, Distinction VIII.3). 
22 (Rogers 1996; Scythopolis 1998, 220; Dolezal 2011). 
23 (Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles II.10). 
24 (Mullins 2016b, 137ff).  
25 (Mullins 2016b). 
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aseity in some recent theological and philosophical work.26 As such, it will be worth 
clearly distinguishing the two for contemporary readers. Divine aseity can be stated as 
follows.  
 
Aseity: A being exists a se if and only if its existence is in no way dependent 
upon, nor derived from, anything ad extra.  
 
If that is aseity, one will rightly ask what self-sufficiency is. As the 17th Century 
theologian Christopher Blackwood explains, God’s self-sufficiency is an attribute of 
God’s perfect nature. Self-sufficiency expresses the fact that God has all of the 
perfections that we find in creatures. His possession of these perfections is not 
dependent upon anything outside of Himself. He has no need for anything outside of 
Himself in order to be perfect. In fact, God is the cause and source of all the perfections 
we find in creation.27  
Given these sorts of claims from Blackwood and others, I believe that we can 
formulate divine self-sufficiency as follows.  
 
Divine Self-sufficiency: A being is divinely self-sufficient if and only if that 
being’s perfect essential nature is not dependent upon, nor derived from, 
anything ad extra.  
 
For the sake of clarity, it is worth emphasizing the difference between aseity and self-
sufficiency. Aseity is a claim about the existence of God. Self-sufficiency is a claim about 
the nature of God. Given the classical theist’s commitment to divine simplicity, aseity 
and self-sufficiency are identical to each other. However, other theists who reject divine 
simplicity do not need to make this identity claim. I believe that this identity claim is the 
reason why some contemporary proponents of classical theism believe that aseity and 
self-sufficiency entail timelessness, immutability, and simplicity. However, I believe that 
they are smuggling in simplicity before laying out their arguments. More on that below.   
What we have before us is the classical understanding of God. Now we must turn our 
attention to the classical doctrine of divine impassibility. Further, we must investigate 
the claim that the impassible God cannot suffer.  
 
2. Why Can’t the Impassible God Suffer?  
 
Classical theism affirms that God cannot suffer because God is impassible. Somehow 
impassibility is supposed to logically follow from timelessness, immutability, and 
                                                          
26 (Bird 2013, 128; Mann 2005, 36). 
27 (Blackwood 1658, 316). 
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simplicity. By way of example, John of Damascus explains that God is passionless 
because God lacks a body, and is without flux or change, and is simple and 
uncompounded. (On the Orthodox Faith, I.8) Here one can see a common theme with 
impassibility that God cannot undergo a change or alteration of His emotional state. 
This somehow entails that God cannot suffer, though I fail to see how lacking change 
can entail a lack of suffering.28  
To see why this is not obvious, consider the following. It is logically possible for a 
timeless and immutable being to be in a state of eternal and unchanging torment.29 It is 
logically possible in that nothing about this concept entails a logical contradiction. There 
is nothing of the form “A and not-A” in saying that a timeless being is immutably 
suffering. Perhaps the classical theist will wish to say that it is metaphysically 
impossible in that something about the nature of a timeless and immutable being is 
inconsistent with undergoing eternal torment. If the classical theist is correct about this, 
she has not yet specified why this is the case. The classical theist will need to bring in 
some sort of perfect being intuition, assumption about perfection, another divine 
attribute, or another Christian doctrine that is not captured in the doctrine of divine 
timelessness nor divine immutability.30 In other words, nothing about God being 
timeless nor immutable by itself explains why God cannot suffer. What some of those 
other assumptions and attributes are will be discussed in section III. 
Further, consider divine simplicity. There is nothing logically impossible about the 
notion that a simple God suffers. If a simple God suffers, this God will be identical to the 
act of suffering. Again, this entails no logical contradiction. As stated before, a classical 
theist will wish to deny that the simple God can suffer, but nothing within divine 
simplicity by itself can explain why this is the case. The classical theist must bring in 
other intuitions and assumptions about the nature of divine perfection in order to 
explain why the impassible God cannot suffer. Nothing about timelessness, 
immutability, nor simplicity by themselves makes it obvious why the simple God 
cannot suffer.  
What about divine aseity? Whilst aseity is an important divine attribute, it cannot 
significantly motive impassibility. Aseity only tells us that God’s existence does not 
                                                          
28 (Weinandy 2000, 99-100). 
29 (Creel 1986, 132). 
30 I am aware of different kinds of arguments that seek to show the metaphysical impossibility of a 
timeless and immutable God suffering. Yet in each case, the argument focuses on some further 
inconsistency that goes beyond mere timelessness and immutability. For example, (Randles 1900, chapter 
4) argues that the eternal suffering of God would be inconsistent with God’s blessedness. In another 
argument, he says that the eternal suffering of God would be inconsistent with God’s justice and the claim 
that all suffering is punishment. In a third argument, Randles says that God’s eternal suffering would be 
inconsistent with the heavenly bliss promised to creatures. For a recent example of this third argument, 
see (Blankenhorn 2016, 458). 
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depend upon anything external to the divine nature. By itself, it says nothing of the 
emotional life of God. A proponent of divine passibility can easily affirm the aseity of 
God, and maintain that God undergoes a fluctuation of His emotions after He freely 
decides to create a universe, and enter into covenantal relations with it.31 Nothing about 
God contingently experiencing moments of suffering threatens His necessary existence. 
Nothing about God freely creating a universe, caring for it, and suffering redemptively 
for it, entails that God has a cause for His existence. As already stated, the impassibilist 
will need to appeal to something else in order to explain why the impassible God cannot 
suffer.  
It is interesting to note that many early Church fathers and later theologians 
continually speak of God’s impassibility within the context of God’s self-sufficiency.32 
By itself, self-sufficiency does not automatically lend any credibility to impassibility. 
This is because intuitions about what it means to be a perfect being vary. For instance, 
the contemporary philosopher, Linda Zagzebski, believes that maximal empathy, or 
omnisubjectivity, is a perfection. Omnisubjectivity is the perfect capacity to engage in 
maximal empathy.33 An omnisubjective God is self-sufficient in that His essential perfect 
nature includes the power or capacity to engage in maximal empathy. Nothing ad extra 
to the divine nature makes God have this capacity. God’s possession of this capacity 
does not depend upon anything ad extra to the divine nature either. So an 
omnisubjective God is a self-sufficient God. Further, the triune persons can eternally 
exercise this capacity with one another sans creation.  
As Zagzebski makes clear, an omnisubjective God is a passible God.34 When an 
omnisubjective God freely creates a contingent universe, He will exercise His 
empathetic capacity in new ways as He engages with creatures in the economy of 
salvation. By engaging in empathy with His creatures, He will have a perfect 
understanding of creaturely conscious states. Some of these creaturely conscious states 
involve suffering. In the act of being empathetic with His beloved creatures, God will 
have a perfect grasp of their suffering, and as such will experience empathetic suffering 
with them. This will not be something that impassibilists can coherently maintain 
because having empathy entails suffering at particular times as God empathetically 
engages with His creatures. As the impassibilist Girolamo Zanchius makes clear, 
empathy can bring suffering, and this is something an impassible God cannot do. So 
impassibilists rule out empathy from the divine life.35  
                                                          
31 (Mullins 2014). I believe that the arguments developed in defense of divine temporality can be 
modified to defend certain claims about divine passibility with regards to God’s aseity. 
32 (Shedd 1888, 178-79; Cf. Marshall 2009, 293; Scrutton 2011, 17-19). 
33 (Zagzebski 2013). 
34 (Zagzebski 2013, 45). 
35 (Zanchius 1601, 357-358). 
R.T. MULLINS 
11 
 
Notice, though, that empathy is ruled out from the divine life because it brings 
suffering upon God. Nothing about God’s self-sufficiency has been called into question 
here. Instead, divine impassibility has been called into question. So it does not seem like 
self-sufficiency is doing any work to motivate divine impassibility. Yet, classical theists 
insist that self-sufficiency is logically connected to impassibility.36 What is going on 
here? I believe that there are several things going on here that need to be clarified in this 
regard because self-sufficiency is not doing the work that the classical theist thinks it is.  
In particular, it seems to me that divine simplicity is being conflated with self-
sufficiency in most theological arguments for impassibility. In particular, the claim that 
God is purely actual, and cannot have any contingent or accidental properties. This rules 
out God having any dispositional properties such as powers or capacities that can be 
actualized. The divine passibilist seems to be claiming that omnisubjectivity is a power 
that God possesses. This power is considered to be a perfection by the passibilist 
because it gives God the ability to grasp the conscious states of all beings. The classical 
theist, however, has already ruled such things out of the divine nature since the classical 
theist affirms that God is purely actual. A purely actual God does not have abilities, or 
capacities, that He can actualize because that would entail God having potential. So a 
classical theist might say that her commitment to divine simplicity rules out possible 
perfections like omnisubjectivity from consideration. This is worth noting since it is 
divine simplicity, and not self-sufficiency, that is doing the work here in ruling out 
omnisubjectivity. Of course, a proponent of omnisubjectivity could say that God’s 
omnisubjectivity is purely actualized, thus removing any potential in God. In which 
case, omnisubjectivity would be not be ruled out by divine simplicity. So, once again, 
nothing about divine simplicity by itself explains why the impassible God cannot suffer.  
At this point in the conversation, one will most likely ask again, “Why can’t the 
impassible God suffer?” It seems to me that there are no clear systematic connections 
between divine timelessness, immutability, simplicity, aseity, and self-sufficiency that 
will give us an answer to this question. I believe that one must look elsewhere within 
classical theism to discover the answer to this question.  
 
3. The Emotions of the Impassible God 
 
What must be understood is that classical theism affirms certain principles, 
assumptions, and divine attributes that other Christian theists will deny. These other 
assumptions and attributes can explain why the impassible God cannot suffer. Relevant 
for my purposes here is the classical understanding of God’s emotions. Though 20th 
Century passibilist theologians have often asserted that the impassible God lacks any 
emotions, we will soon see that this is false.  
                                                          
36 (Wittman 2016, 133). 
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To get us started in understanding these issues, I shall begin by focusing on the 
following definition of impassibility from James Arminius. He writes that,  
 
IMPASSIBILITY is a pre-eminent mode of the Essence of God, according to which 
it is devoid of all suffering or feeling; not only because nothing can act against 
this Essence, for it is of infinite Being and devoid of external cause; but likewise 
because it cannot receive the act of any thing, for it is of simple Entity.—
Therefore, Christ has not suffered according to the Essence of his Deity.37 
 
In order to gain some traction in our understanding of impassibility, it is worth 
summing up three common impassibility themes that I believe make up the core of the 
doctrine. First, there is a widespread agreement that the impassible God cannot suffer. 
The ‘cannot’ here is quite strong. It implies that it is broadly logically, or metaphysically, 
impossible for God to suffer.38 Second, underlying this notion is the assumption that 
God cannot be moved, nor acted upon, by anything ad extra to the divine nature. Again, 
the ‘cannot’ is quite strong. It implies that it is broadly logically, or metaphysically, 
impossible for God to be moved, or acted upon, by anything outside of God.39 Third, 
there is also a widespread agreement that God lacks passions, but this claim needs to be 
nuanced since there is disagreement among classical theists about the nature of 
passions. This disagreement makes it quite difficult to fully articulate the doctrine of 
impassibility. 
Why is it a problem that there is no agreement on the nature of passions? Without 
this agreement, it is difficult to understand what is being denied of God in the doctrine 
of divine impassibility. On the level of grammar, to say that God is impassible is to say 
that God lacks passions. If we don’t know what a passion is, we do not know what we 
are denying of God. Contrast this with divine timelessness. To say that God is timeless 
is to deny time of God. Throughout the Christian tradition there is a fairly widespread 
consensus that to undergo change is to be in time. There is a strong conceptual linkage 
between time and change. So when the classical Christian theologian says that God is 
timeless, we can understand that this involves undergoing no change. With regards to 
impassibility, there is not as much of a wide consensus on what is involved with having 
a passion. So this makes it difficult to figure out what is being denied of God in the 
doctrine of divine impassibility. For the purposes of this paper, it makes it difficult to 
understand why an impassible being cannot suffer or be acted upon by something 
external to God.  
                                                          
37 (Arminius 1986, Disputation IV.XVII). 
38 (Helm 1990, 120-121). 
39 (Creel 1997, 314). 
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What counts as a passion is a matter of dispute amongst the ancient and medieval 
Christians.40 The Christian tradition shows an interesting variety of opinion on what 
counts as a passion. There are theologians who wish to say that mercy does not count as 
a passion, so God is merciful. Others, like Thomas Aquinas, hold that mercy is a passion 
and as such God cannot literally be said to be merciful.41  
There is a further, and related, difficulty with emotions. In contemporary parlance, it 
is more common to speak of emotions than passions, and a great deal of the modern 
impassibility debate has revolved around whether or not God has emotions. A problem 
with this is that there is no agreed upon definition of emotions in the history of 
philosophy, and that debate continues to this day. Further, there is not a nice, neat, 
mapping of certain conceptions of emotions onto the differing conceptions of passions, 
though some promising proposals have been articulated.42 As such, things in this regard 
can sometimes be a bit confusing. For example, the 19th Century theologian William 
Shedd denies that God has any passions, but he holds that God has two emotions: love 
and wrath. Shedd says that these two emotions are in fact one and the same moral 
attribute of God—holiness.43 Shedd is not alone in affirming that God lacks passions, 
and yet is full of love and wrath. This is a fairly common claim throughout Church 
history, though not all agree that God literally has wrath.44  
How does Shedd get to this conclusion that God lacks passions, yet has the emotions 
of love and wrath? To answer this question, we need to make impassibility less 
mysterious and vague. In order to demystify the doctrine of impassibility, I wish to 
focus on the following question: how does one go about deciding which emotions or 
passions can truly be literally attributed to an impassible God? I believe that the answer 
to this question will help us gain a great deal of understanding of the doctrine of divine 
impassibility. I focus on literal attribution because impassibilists have long held that 
various emotions predicated of God in scripture can be metaphorically attributed to 
God. What I am concerned with now is which can be literally attributed to God—i.e. 
emotions like love and wrath. Answering this question will help one understand why 
the impassible God cannot suffer.  
There are several criteria that early and medieval theologians express that eventually 
become part of what later Christian theologians use to develop a clearer account of 
impassibility. To start, most impassibilists have some sort of inconsistency criterion. It 
can be stated as follows:  
 
                                                          
40 (Scrutton 2011, chapter 1). 
41 (Aquinas, Summa Theologia, 1.Q21.a3). 
42 (Scrutton 2011, chapter 2). 
43 (Shedd 1888, 174). 
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Inconsistency Criterion: Any passion or emotion that is inconsistent with the 
divine nature cannot literally be attributed to God.  
 
There are various examples of this criterion in Church history, and I believe that one 
can develop more precise inconsistency criteria from these examples. Identifying these 
criteria will help us overcome the disagreement about passions among classical theists, 
and help us discern which emotional attributes can be literally predicated of an 
impassible God. 
Some early Church fathers held that all passions are of a sinful nature or sinful 
disposition. Not all agreed. Some argued that only certain passions are of a sinful 
nature. All agree, though, that God is morally perfect. So one criterion is inconsistency 
with God’s moral perfection.45 Any passion like lust, greed, or pride must be ruled out 
from being literally attributed to the morally perfect God. So let us call this the Moral 
Inconsistency Criterion.  
 
Moral Inconsistency Criterion: Any passion or emotion that is inconsistent with 
God’s moral perfection cannot literally be attributed to God.  
 
Another criterion relates to reason. Some fathers held that the passions are 
inherently irrational. According to this view, anyone who acts out of a passion must be 
doing so irrationally. The passionate person does not have her emotions lined up with 
reason. Such a person is out of control, and ruled by emotions instead of sober reason. 
However, other Church fathers held that not all passions are inherently irrational. All 
agreed that God is perfectly rational. His actions are always inline with, in fact identical 
to, His wisdom given divine simplicity. So another criterion is inconsistency with God’s 
perfect rationality. Call this the Rational Inconsistency Criterion.  
 
Rational Inconsistency Criterion: Any passion or emotion that entails irrationality 
cannot literally be attributed to God.  
 
Some theologians held that certain passions are morally and rationally neutral, whilst 
other passions are positive. For these theologians, God can have the positive passions, 
like love, but cannot have the negative passions that imply sin or irrationality.46 Even 
though there is a disagreement here over what counts as a passion, or even a negative 
emotion, a clear picture seems to emerge. God can be said to have whatever passions or 
emotions pass the Moral Inconsistency Criterion and the Rational Inconsistency 
Criterion.  
                                                          
45 (Gavrilyuk 2004, 51). 
46 (Lister 2013, chapter 3; Scrutton 2011, chapters 1 and 2). 
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This is a good start to understanding impassibility, but it is not the whole story since 
a passible God can easily satisfy these criteria. Passibilists will say that God has an 
emotional responsiveness to creation, but never in a way that is immoral or irrational.47 
When the passibilist affirms that God only has emotions that are moral and rational, she 
is also affirming that God can experience suffering. How is this so? The claim from 
passibilists is that some emotions are cognitive, or intellectual, in that they are 
judgements about the world.48 Not all emotional experiences are cognitive, but some are. 
The cognitive emotions can be rational or irrational depending on how well they track 
reality, and how well inline they are with one’s pattern of commitments and considered 
judgments.49 The claim is that cognitive emotions allow one to perceive the value of 
objects in the world. An emotional response to an object is partly constituted by the way 
the individual perceives the value of the object.50 An object has value to an agent if she 
perceives it to be worthy of her attention, and worthy of her to act on behalf of the 
object.51 If an emotional response fails to properly track the value of the object, the 
emotional response is not rational. If an emotional response properly tracks the value of 
the object, the emotional response is rational.52  
For example, imagine that your friend Sally has just found out that she has lost her 
grandmother to cancer. As far as you know, Sally cares deeply about her grandmother. 
If Sally experiences grief and sorrow over hearing of the loss of her grandmother, that 
seems like an appropriate response to the situation. Sally is recalling the great value of 
her grandmother, and is upset by perceiving the great disvalue of losing her 
grandmother. The passibilist says the same is true of God. God cares deeply for the 
universe that He has made. He knows full well the value of the universe, and has 
declared it to be very good. (Genesis 1:31) The passibilist further claims that God greatly 
values His covenant people. God considers His covenant people to be worthy of His 
attention and action, and as such God is emotionally responsive to them. When they are 
unfaithful to the covenant, God is grieved by their unfaithfulness because He correctly 
perceives the disvalue of their immoral actions. In other words, God’s grief is a rational 
and moral response to Israel’s behavior. Yet, when unfaithful Israel suffers, God feels 
sorrow for them because He cares for them, and wants them to flourish according to His 
covenantal promise.53 The passibilist claims that God’s emotional responses to these 
situations accurately tracks the values in reality, and so God’s emotional experiences are 
                                                          
47 (Taliaferro 1989). 
48 (Scrutton 2011, chapter 3). 
49 (Helm 2001).   
50 (Todd 2014, 706). 
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rational and moral. In God’s emotional responses to His creatures, He sometimes 
experiences suffering.  
What this means is that nothing about the Rational Inconsistency Criterion or the 
Moral Inconsistency Criterion by themselves explains why God cannot suffer. So more 
is at play in the classical Christian tradition in trying to figure out which emotions can 
be literally attributed to an impassible God and which cannot. As I shall discuss below, 
it seems that the classical theist would agree somewhat with the passibilist about the 
nature of cognitive emotions. Cognitive emotions track the value of reality. Where the 
passibilist and impassibilist seem to disagree is over how God evaluates things. 
Understanding this emotional evaluation will help one understand why the impassible 
God cannot suffer.  
There is a divine attribute that is often overlooked in contemporary discussions that 
will help us understand why the impassible God cannot suffer. It is an attribute that has 
wide affirmation in classical Christian and Hindu theology.54 This divine attribute is 
often called God’s blessedness in older theological texts. This is also sometimes referred 
to as God’s happiness, bliss, or felicity. According to Scrutton, “the early church tended 
to see apatheia and/or blissfulness as an ideal on a ‘metaphysical’ as well as on a 
specifically moral level. Because passions were thought to be involuntary and to 
overcome reason, the experience of passions would disturb God’s existence and bliss.” 55  
What exactly is this attribute of divine blessedness? James Ussher explains it as 
follows: “It is the property of God, whereby he hath all fullnesse [sic] of delight and 
contentment in himself.” According to Ussher, all felicity, happiness, endless bliss, and 
glory arises from God’s perfect nature. So God has no need for anything else because He 
is perfectly happy in Himself. Ussher goes on to explain that, because God is perfectly 
happy, nothing outside of God can move His will. With creatures like you and I, we are 
moved to act by external factors. For example, if I see someone who is in a state of pure 
misery, I will hopefully be moved by this towards an action that will help alleviate this 
person’s misery. Yet, according to Ussher, God is not like this. Since God is perfectly 
happy, He cannot be moved to act by anything outside of Himself. Instead, God can 
only will to act towards His own glory.56  
Before moving forward, it is worth pausing to reflect on several things. In particular, 
note the connection to the impassibilist claim that God cannot be moved by anything ad 
extra to the divine nature. Ussher has not fully explained why this happy, impassible 
God cannot be moved by anything external to the divine nature. The passibilist might 
complain that such a God is failing to have emotional responses that properly track the 
values in reality. How can such a God know the suffering of the world, and yet remain 
                                                          
54 (Radhakrishnan and Morre 1957, 63, 150, 514).  
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R.T. MULLINS 
17 
 
perfectly happy? The answer to this lies in the impassible God’s emotional evaluation of 
Himself. 
Thomists have long reflected on divine blessedness, and it seems to me that one will 
find the answers we have been looking for here.57 Like Ussher, Eric Silverman proclaims 
that God is the object of His own joy. How can this be? According to Thomists like 
Silverman, joy is an act of the will whereby one rests her will in a good object. On the 
Thomistic doctrine of God, God is identical to the supreme good. So if God rests His will 
in Himself/goodness itself, then God will be infinitely happy. Because God correctly 
recognizes Himself to be the supreme, and infinitely good object, He will rightly rest His 
will in Himself. Thus making Himself the object of His own eternal, and immutable joy. 
Silverman explains that God cannot fail to be the object of His own joy because such a 
notion would be incoherent. If God somehow lacked infinite joy, Silverman says that 
this would indicate that God is deficient in His evaluation of Himself as the ultimate 
good. Surely an omniscient God would not be subject to such a deficient evaluation.58  
Again, it seems that the impassibilist is claiming that God’s emotional life does 
involve tracking the values in reality. Shedd is quite clear that happiness is a pleasurable 
emotion that arises from the harmony of the emotion with its proper object. In the case 
of the impassible God, Shedd says that the object of God’s happiness is Himself.59 The 
impassibilist is saying that, as the supreme good, God is the ultimate value in reality. 
God knows that He is the ultimate value, and has the proper emotional response to that 
value—i.e. perfect happiness.  
Yet this still does not fully explain why the impassible God cannot suffer. The 
passibilist affirms that God is the supreme good, the ultimate object of value in the 
world.60 Yet the passibilist affirms that God places values on creatures as well as His 
relationships with those creatures, which explains why God sometimes suffers. The 
passible God values His creation in that He sees His creatures as being worthy of His 
attention and action. What is the difference between the passibilist and the impassibilist 
here? I gather that the impassibilist believes that God’s value swamps all of the value of 
created reality in a particular way. What that particular way is, however, is not clear to 
me. Whatever that particular way is would explain why God cannot be moved from His 
state of perfect bliss or blessedness.  
Perhaps the claim from the impassibilist is something like the following: nothing 
external to God is of such value that God could possibly be moved to experience joy or 
sorrow because of it. If the impassible God were to be moved to experience sorrow for 
some created thing, the impassible God would be failing to properly evaluate that 
                                                          
57 (Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I.90). 
58 (Sliverman 2013, 168). 
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60 The notion of the great chain of being has come under fire in contemporary thought. For a recent 
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creature. The impassibilist is saying that God would be failing to properly evaluate that 
creature because God would be acting as if that creature has more value than the 
supreme good.61 That is something that a proponent of impassibility will not allow for. 
As the omniscient supreme good, the impassible God cannot make such a deficient 
emotional evaluation. So the impassible God must be supremely happy or blessed.62  
With this understanding of divine blessedness before us, one might ask how this 
helps us with articulating the doctrine of divine impassibility. Drawing on the Church 
tradition, William Shedd offers the following criterion of blessedness to sort out which 
emotions can be attributed to God: “The criterion for determining which form of feeling 
is literally, and which is metaphorically attributable to God, is the divine blessedness. 
God cannot be the subject of any emotion that is intrinsically and necessarily an 
unhappy one.”63 Call this the Blessedness Criterion.  
 
Blessedness Criterion: Any passion or emotion that entails a disruption of God’s 
happiness cannot literally be attributed to God.  
 
In this Blessedness Criterion, one can find an explanation for why the impassible God 
cannot suffer. God cannot experience any emotion that conflicts with the proper 
emotional evaluation of Himself—i.e. bliss. According to the impassibilist, it would be 
irrational, and immoral, for God to have the emotional evaluation of something external 
to God that would disturb His bliss. For example, Tertullian claims that God is perfect in 
all of His emotions such as mercy, gentleness, and anger. Yet, God experiences these 
emotions in such a way that it does not conflict with His perfect happiness.64  
 
Conclusion 
 
Due to space constraints, I must take stock of what we have discussed so far, though I 
think more needs to be said in order to fully grasp the doctrine of divine impassibility. 
Given the criteria and assumptions that I have identified, I believe that we can restate 
the three core impassible themes as follows. First, it is metaphysically impossible for 
God to suffer. Second, it is metaphysically impossible for God to be moved, or acted 
upon, by anything outside of God. Third, it is metaphysically impossible for God to 
have an emotion that is irrational, immoral, or that disrupts His perfect happiness. 
My main question in this paper has been, “Why can the impassible God not suffer?” 
The answer seems to be that an impassible God has an emotional evaluation of Himself 
                                                          
61 (Wittmann 2016, 145). 
62 I am not entirely satisfied with this explanation for why the impassible God cannot suffer, but space 
limitations do not allow for a further exploration here.   
63 See (Shedd 1888, 174; Gavrilyuk 2004, 51-62) for a discussion on divine anger and wrath.  
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as the supreme good. This emotional evaluation brings God such perfect happiness that 
nothing could possibly disrupt His happiness. The impassible God’s evaluation of 
Himself and His creation is such that it is metaphysically impossible for Him to be 
moved by anything other than Himself. To be sure, there are many lingering questions 
about this impassible God. One might like to know how such a God could possibly 
resemble the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jesus, but that conversation must be left to 
another day. My hope is that with a clearer understanding of impassibility on the table, 
theologians can be in a better position to offer critiques and defenses of impassibility in 
future debates.  
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